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ABSTRACT 
 
A close examination of the MENA region economies reveals a number of 
fundamental sources of macroeconomic fluctuations. These include economic factors 
such as exchange rate instability, large public debt, current account deficits, and 
escalation of inflation. The political factors such as government instability, 
corruption, bureaucracy, and internal conflicts also are major sources of 
macroeconomic instability. Thus, the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in these 
countries are expected to be inhomogeneous. This paper determines sources of 
macroeconomic fluctuations for 16 MENA economies using a structural VAR model. 
By imposing long-run restrictions on a VAR model, we identify four structural 
shocks: nominal demand, relative demand, supply, the world output, and imported 
input price shocks. Overall,  the  results  show  some  similarities for the source of 
macroeconomic fluctuations  in  these, but  also  some  important differences as well. 
We find important differences even among countries with similar macroeconomic 
conditions, such as the oil exporters and oil importers. Although, oil prices and world 
output are significant sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in oil exporters, in 
almost all countries they do not have the highest share. There is one clear common 
finding of the paper: For all countries, the long-run sources of output fluctuations are 
the real supply and/or real demand shocks. External shocks are secondary for all 
countries. The sources of short-run and price fluctuations are inhomogeneous and 
dominant variables are mostly determined by country specific factors. 
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1. Introduction 
An important question in applied macroeconomics is to quantify the sources of 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Evidence on the relative magnitudes of various factors 
can guide policy-makers who must decide how closely to track various external and 
internal developments as well as theorists who want to know what kind of shocks to 
incorporate into their models. A related goal is to assess the relative importance of 
external shocks as apposed to internal shocks. 
In recent years, understanding and distinguishing among the various factors 
affecting the short- and long-run behavior of macroeconomic time series in the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region has been one of the rapidly growing 
research areas. Using a variety of econometric techniques, a substantial body of 
literature has documented various relative magnitudes to the several potential sources 
of macroeconomic fluctuations for the MENA countries. Some studies concentrate on 
the determinants of economic growth (Abed and Davoodi, 2003; Makdisi, Fattah, and 
Limam, 2003; Hakura, 2004; Tamberi, 2005) while others consider how increasing 
trade and financial linkages affect various economic outcomes in the region (Abed 
and Davoodi. 2003; Hirata, Kim, and Kose, 2004). Some recent studies document the 
main features of business cycles in the MENA countries (Hirata, Kim, and Kose, 
2004; Sayan, 2004; Süssmuth and Woitek, 2004; Lucke, 2004; Al Zoubi and 
Maghyereh, 2005; Hirata, Kim, and Kose, 2007). A collection of papers focusing on 
issues such as the demographic transition to the financial liberalization process in the 
MENA region can be found in Iqbal (2001). Shafik (1998) also provides a collection 
of papers on the dynamics of economic growth, transitional issues, poverty, and 
environment in the MENA region. 
The volatile changes in the MENA region economies during the last three 
decades created controversies about the relative importance of potential sources of 
macroeconomic fluctuations. Several studies attribute a significant role to terms of 
trade shocks and external linkages (Makdisi et al. 2003; Diboglu and Alesia, 2004; 
Hirata et al. 2004 and 2007). Using a similar structural vector autoregressive (SVAR) 
model approach as in our study Hoffmaister and Roldos (1997) and Ahmed and 
Loungani (1998) study the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in developing 
countries and find that terms of trade and world output shocks play a significant role. 
 4 
Mehrara and Oskoui (2007) used a SVAR model to examine the sources of 
macroeconomic fluctuations in five oil-exporter MENA countries. They found that 
the oil price shocks are the main source of output fluctuations in Saudi Arabia and 
Iran, but not in Kuwait and Indonesia.  
Some other studies pointed out the significant role played by real demand 
shocks—fiscal imbalances and real exchange rate misalignments—in the MENA 
region countries (Domaç and Shabsigh, 2001; Nashashibi, Brown, and Fedelino, 
2001; Jalali-Naini, 2000). The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the 
sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in the MENA region. There is a spreading 
view in the literature that the external shocks play the most important role in 
macroeconomic fluctuations for the MENA region countries. Monetary policy has 
been also believed to be destabilizing for a long time. Using a small open economy 
model tailored to the MENA region economies we estimate the relative importance of 
external shocks (foreign input price and world output), nominal demand shocks, fiscal 
shocks, and domestic supply shocks using data on 16 countries (see Table 1). Our 
analyses show that the external shocks—terms of trade proxied by oil prices and the 
world output—play the second most important role for countries that heavily depends 
on oil exporters. Our results are complimentary to Mehrara and Oskoui (2007) for 
Saudi Arabia, but we find that the role of oil prices in macroeconomic fluctuations in 
Kuwait is comparable to their role in Saudi Arabia. Our results also show that the oil 
prices do not contribute much to macroeconomic fluctuations in Iran. A most 
important finding of the paper is the significant role of supply shocks in output 
fluctuations. We also find that the increased public debt by affecting the relative 
demand has been the major contributor to the macroeconomic fluctuations in these 
countries. Not strikingly our estimates show that the macroeconomic fluctuations in 
the MENA countries largely depend on macroeconomic policies in the individual 
countries.  
We estimate that external shocks account for about 1–15% of the short-run 
variance in domestic output. The long-run estimate varies from 1% to 25%. The 
external shocks explain 1-45% of variance of the aggregate price level in the short-run 
while they explain more than 35% in the long-run, mostly due to the changes in oil 
prices. Nominal shocks explain 12-95% of the variance of the domestic price level in 
the short run. In the long-run, they explain less than 60% of the variation in the price 
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level in most countries. The contribution of fiscal shocks to the short-run variance of 
the output varies from 1% to 75% across the countries. The long-run estimate is less 
than 10% for most countries and less than 20% for all countries. The short-run 
estimate for the price level is from 2% to 50%, whereas the long-run estimate is less 
than 30%, except two countries. The contribution of supply shocks to long-run real 
output fluctuations varies from 50% to 85%, and it is above 50% for all countries 
except one country (Kuwait). Thus, we find that a sizable fraction of the variation in 
real aggregate output and aggregate price level in the MENA countries can be 
attributed to the supply shocks. The fluctuations in the price level are also mostly due 
to the nominal demand shocks. Thus, our findings are consistent with the real 
business cycle theory of Kydland and Prescott (1982), Long and Plosser (1983), and 
Prescott (1986). Our findings are also complementary to the findings of Agénor, 
McDermott, and Prasad (1998), where it has been found that the supply side shocks 
are driving business cycles in developing countries.   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the approach used for 
investigating the sources of output fluctuations in the MENA countries. Section 3 
presents the empirical results derived from the impulse response analysis of shocks 
and their variance decompositions. Section 4 concludes. 
2. A SVAR Model for the MENA countries 
The MENA region economies can be grouped into two broad categories as the oil-rich 
and oil poor. Terms of trade shocks are considered to be major source of 
macroeconomic fluctuations for countries in both groups linkages (Makdisi et al. 
2003; Diboglu and Alesia, 2004; Hirata et al. 2004 and 2007). Thus, countries in both 
groups are highly dependent on the world input prices which could be well 
approximated by real oil prices. These countries are also highly dependent on the 
foreign demand due to large current account deficit and/or increasing share of exports 
in real GDP. To study the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in MENA region 
economies, we follow SVAR approach proposed by Blanchard and Quah (1989) and 
extended to open economies by Ahmed et al. (1993), Bjørnland (1998), and 
Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001). We propose a SVAR model that contains five 
variables; log of real oil price ( fmtp ), log of real world output (
f
ty ), log of real 
domestic output ( ty ), log of real effective exchange rate ( tq ), and log of consumer 
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prices ( tp ). This model captures the fragility of the MENA region economies by 
extending the Blanchard and Quah model to incorporate external shocks via the 
inclusion of variables fmtp  and 
f
ty . Thus, the model incorporates effects of shocks 
from world input prices and world output. To be consistent with the assumption of a 
small open economy, domestic shocks are not allowed to affect the world variables. 
The structural model used can be expressed as follows: 
 ( )t tx C L εΔ =  (1) 
where ( , , , , )f ft mt t t t tx p y y q p ′Δ = Δ Δ Δ Δ Δ  and Δ indicate the first differences. Consistent 
with the common findings in the literature we assume that all variables are 
nonstationary, integrated of order 1, I(1), and the variables are not cointegrated in 
levels1. In this equation C(L) is an infinite order matrix lag polynomial defined as 
2
0 1 2( )C L C C L C L= + + +L  in the lag operator L and C0 is an identity matrix. The 
observed fluctuations in the vector of five variables ( , , , , )f ft mt t t t tx p y y q p ′=  are due to 
five uncorrelated structural shocks ( , , , , )mf yf y q pt t t t t tε ε ε ε ε ε ′=  with [ ]t tE Iε ε ′ = .  
The model identifies five structural shocks. The external shocks are the shocks 
in the input prices proxied by real oil price, mftε , and the world output, 
yf
tε . The 
model identifies three domestic shocks: supply shocks, possibly including the 
structural reforms such as tariff and trade reforms, ytε , relative demand shocks arising 
from changes in public spending/debt and relative preferences, qtε , and aggregate 
demand shock, which captures the effects of nominal variables, ptε .  
 Consider the long-run effects of structural shock by setting L=1 in equation 
(1):  
 
11 12 13 14 15
21 22 23 24 25
31 32 33 34 35
41 42 43 44 45
51 52 53 54 55
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
C C C C C
C C C C C
C C C C C C
C C C C C
C C C C C
⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥=
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
 (2) 
                                                
1 The nonstationarity and no cointegration assumptions are verified, but not reported here for brevity. The results are available 
upon request.  
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We need 10 long-run restrictions imposed on this matrix for the structural model to be 
just identified (see Balanchard and Quah, 657). As in Parente and Prescott (1994) we 
include world output, fty , in our model to capture the technological spill over effect 
from industrialized countries. The real price of oil, fmtp , is included in the model since 
the long-run level of domestic output depends on the domestic price of imported 
intermediate inputs. An increase in the price of intermediate inputs acts like a 
negative Hicks-neutral technological change for oil importers and it may serve as a 
positive Hicks-neutral technological change for oil exporters. Higher revenue streams 
from increased oil prices can finance productive physical and social investment, and 
therefore improve economic growth. Both the world output and oil price shocks are 
significant for all the MENA region countries since all of these are small open 
economies. The long run impact of these two shocks will show the significance of 
foreign shocks for macroeconomic fluctuations. We assume that an expansion in the 
long-run world output would not affect the relevant intermediate inputs in a 
differential way so that their relative price does not change. This implies that 
12 (1) 0C = . Consistent with the assumption of a small open economy, we assume that 
the domestic shocks do not affect he world output and world input prices in the long-
run (essentially also in the short-run), implying that  13(1)C = 14 (1)C =  15 (1)C = 
23(1)C =  24 (1)C =   25(1) 0C = . 
In this model fiscal expansion leads to real exchange rate appreciation 
changing the composition of demand towards non-tradable goods. Thus, the effect of 
fiscal policy shock in our model is captured by inclusion of the real exchange rate, tq . 
We assume that fiscal polices have ambiguous effect on the real domestic output, ty .  
In order to allow nominal variables as a source of short-run macroeconomic 
fluctuations, which the literature overwhelmingly consider to be highly relevant case 
for the MENA countries, the real money supply needs to be added to the model. 
However, this is not necessary since the SVAR model we estimate only requires the 
restriction implied by the long-run neutrality of money and the nominal exchange rate 
to capture the effects of nominal shocks. Further, the explicit modeling of money and 
nominal exchange rate for these countries complicated since variety of different 
monetary policy regimes and at least four different exchange rate regimes during our 
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sample are adopted in various countries. In order to avoid these complications we 
restrain from explicit specification of nominal variables and add a general equation 
for the evaluation of the domestic price level, tp . The price level variable is 
determined by the response of monetary authorities to external shocks, fiscal and 
other polices, as well as other exogenous nominal shocks.  
The long-run domestic output is determined by the supply factors and 
unaffected by the demand shocks, implying that 34 35(1) (1) 0.C C= =  Finally, the long-
run level of real exchange rate is determined by supply and relative demand not by 
aggregate demand or nominal shocks, which implies the last restriction  45(1) 0C =  in 
our model. This assumption is also consistent with the assumption of perfect capital 
mobility. Under perfect capital mobility, aggregate demand shocks have no long-run 
effect on real money balances and real interest rate, therefore no effect on the real 
exchange rate through shocks in the price level. Most countries in our sample have 
liberalized the current account and the assumption of perfect capital mobility is 
realistic is not unrealistic during the most of our sample period.  
 Incorporating these ten restrictions on the 25 × 25 matrix (1)C , the long-run 
effect of the five shocks on the endogenous variables are given by 
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21 22
31 32 33
41 42 43 44
51 52 53 54 55
(1) 0 0 0 0
(1) (1) 0 0 0
(1) (1) (1) 0 0
(1) (1) (1) (1) 0
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1)
f mf
mt t
f yf
t t
y
t t
q
t t
p
t t
Cp
C Cy
C C Cy
C C C Cq
C C C C Cp
ε
ε
ε
ε
ε
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤Δ ⎡ ⎤
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥Δ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥=Δ
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
Δ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥
⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥Δ ⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
 (3) 
The specification in (3) particularly attempts to capture recent trends in the MENA 
region economies by allowing the real exchange rate shock particularly enter the 
equation. The real exchange rate shock, qtε , is a composite shock that includes 
exogenous changes in the foreign interest rate, changes in the currency risk premium, 
as well as exogenous changes in the balance of payments.  
3. Empirical Results  
Our data set spans the period from 1960 to 2006, but the sample period may vary for 
some countries depending on the data availability. We classify 16 MENA countries 
(see Table 1) into five major groups: (1) oil rich labor importing (G1: Kuwait, Oman, 
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Saudi Arabia), (2) oil rich labor abundant states (G2: Algeria, Iran, Syria), (3) oil poor 
labor abundant NICs (G3: Egypt, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Pakistan, Turkey), (4) 
oil poor limited natural resource states (G4: Israel, Jordan, Tunisia), and (5) natural 
resource poor states (G5: Sudan). All data except the crude oil price were obtained 
from the World Development Indicators (WDI), International Financial Statistics 
(IFS), and the Central Bank of the Republic of Turkey Electronic Data Distribution 
System (CBRT-EDDS). The crude oil price data were taken from the British 
Petroleum Statistical Review of World Energy workbook (June 2007). The real 
effective exchange rate (REER) data were not available for some countries and 
calculated by the authors as the product of the ratio of imports of goods and services 
of each country in national currency to imports of goods and services of country in 
US dollar and the ratio of producer price (PPI) index in United States to consumer 
price index (CPI) of home country. The GDP deflator for home country is used 
instead of CPI whenever the CPI was not available. All variables are measured in a 
logarithmic scale. The unit root test shows that all the variables are stationary in levels 
and therefore differences to transform into stationary series. The Johansen test 
indicates that the null of a zero cointegrating relationship cannot be rejected at the 1% 
level. 
In order to determine the appropriate lag length we estimated the reduced form 
VAR model, by restricting the lag length between one and four. On the basis of the 
Bayesian (BIC) and the Hannan-Quinn (HQ) Information Criteria (HQ), the sample 
evidence for the entire reduced form VAR system suggested a lag length of one for all 
countries. A series of sequential likelihood ratio tests for a shorter lag length versus a 
longer lag length, suggested also a lag length of one. The p-value of the Portmanteau 
test for residual autocorrelation ranges from 0.08 to 0.85 for a lag length of 8 and 0.02 
to 0.47 for a lag length of 16. The normality of the residuals is rejected using the 
multivariate normality test of Doornik and Hansen (1994). Given that the evidence for 
residual autocorrelation is weak and our sample sizes were mostly around 45 we 
decided estimate the VAR models with a lag length of one for all countries. The VAR 
models were estimated using the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR), rather than 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), owing to the inclusion of zero restrictions on some 
lagged variables (which results in inefficient OLS estimators when the residuals are 
correlated across equations).  
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Given the potential for structural breaks in the sample, conditional on constant 
variances, we test the parameter stability of each equation in the VAR models. We 
performed a series of Wald-tests, developed by Andrews (1993), by allowing the 
break point to vary between observations corresponding approximately to 15 and 85% 
of the sample period from the beginning of the sample. These tests, conditional on 
constant variances, do not suggest evidence of parameter instability in general. The 
Chow break point test does not also suggest parameter instability. However, 
parameter instability is rejected for Egypt, Kuwait, and Iran. 
Ahmed and Park (1994) impose only long-run restrictions of the small open 
economy assumption. However, the small open economy assumption may need to be 
imposed in the short-run as well. Following Hoffmaister and Roldós (2001), we 
assume that small open economy assumption in essence implies independence of 
world output and world input prices from the domestic shock both in the short- and 
long-run. The imposition of short-run restrictions implies a near reduced form VAR 
model that is block exogenous in the world output and world input prices. These 
“over-identifying” restrictions are tested using the multivariate Granger-Sims 
causality tests. The over-identifying test statistics has a value of 14.34 and distributed 
as a 2χ  statistics with 6 (three domestic variables each with two lags) degrees of 
freedom. Thus, the block exogeneity of the world output and world input prices are 
not rejected. Therefore, we impose this restriction on the SVAR model we estimate 
next. 
Impulse Response Analysis 
We turn now to an analysis of the dynamic characteristics of the model itself, and 
therefore the validity of the structure of the SVAR model, by estimating impulse 
response functions (Hamilton, 1994). Each variable in our model can be expressed as 
a combination of current and all past errors. We analyze the dynamic response of 
domestic variables, ,ty  ,tq  and tp to a one standard deviation shock in the five 
structural shocks identified in the model, that is, the world price of imported materials 
proxied by real oil price, mftε , the world output, 
yf
tε , domestic supply shocks, 
y
tε , 
relative demand, qtε , and aggregate demand shock, 
p
tε . The impulse responses are 
given in Figure 1. We calculated the confidence intervals for the impulse responses 
using the bootstrap method of Hall (1992), but these are not reported for clarity and 
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brevity. The impulse response functions are normalized such that zero represents the 
steady-state value of the response variable. 
An oil price shock  
Nine countries in our data highly depend on imported inputs, most importantly 
particularly on the oil imports. The remaining seven countries are oil exporters and 
also highly dependent on the oil prices. In our context one can interpret the oil price 
shock as a terms of trade shock as well, since oil is the major source of fluctuations in 
the terms of trade. A terms of trade change could originate from a rise in the price of 
exports or a fall in the price of imports. Generally, emphasis has been placed upon 
import price, as this has been the historical experience for most of the period we are 
concerned with. The impulse responses due to one standard deviation shock in oil 
price are presented in the first parts of Figure 1. These impulses are generally 
consistent with the expectations. These responses suggest that the oil price shocks in 
the MENA region are quite consistent with the “supply shock” view of the input 
prices; for oil importers output falls, the real exchange rate depreciates, and prices 
increase, which are clearly supported by the impulse responses in Figure 1.  
The impulse responses of domestic variables to oil price shocks across 
countries in different groups are mostly similar with some exceptions. Price levels 
increase in response to a positive shock in oil prices in all countries. This is the 
expected result for countries that depend on oil imports (countries in Groups 3, 4, and 
5). However, a positive response in the price levels is also observed for oil rich 
countries, except Syria and Iran.  
The response of real GDP to oil price shocks is quite dissimilar across and 
within the group of countries. One may expect a positive response for oil rich 
countries, on the one hand, and, a negative response in oil poor countries, on the other 
hand. Our results are consistent with the expectations for the oil rich countries, except 
one country in Group 1 (Kuwait), but there are some exceptions for oil poor countries 
in Groups 3, 4, and 5, which response unexpectedly. These unexpected responses are 
however not significant at 5% significance. Thus, for these countries we may at best 
observe no response of domestic output to oil prices.   
There is not an expected result for the response of real exchange rate to oil 
price shocks. The REER appreciates in some either oil rich or poor countries. In each 
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group there are also countries experiencing REER depreciation such as Kuwait, Syria, 
Turkey, Jordan, and Sudan. 
The highest responding variables to oil price shocks vary across groups and 
within groups. For instance, the highest response come from real GDP in the oil rich 
labor importing states, while the most responsive variable to oil price shocks is the 
price level in oil poor labor abundant states. Finally, with some exceptions, the 
responses to oil price shocks are generally long lasting. This is consistent with the 
supply-shock view of the oil price shock. Only GDP of Sudan and Israel, and REER 
of Algeria, and Malta readjust to their steady states. 
A world output shock 
Figures 1 also shows the responses to a positive shock in the world output. The 
estimates of the responses to world output shocks indicate that among the oil rich 
countries only in Saudi Arabia and Algeria we observe a significant output response. 
Additionally, almost in all countries the price levels positively respond to a positive 
shock in the world output. In the other oil poor groups, in general, we observe similar 
responses to world output shocks. However, we notice that in some oil poor countries 
output responds positively to a shock in the world output while there are not 
significant responses in the price levels (Morocco and Mauritania in G3, Tunisia in 
G4). This is not possible to observe in oil rich groups.  
The responses of the reel exchange rates to a positive shock in the world 
output are analogous to the responses of the price levels, that is the responses vary 
across and within the group. In some countries we observe appreciation while the real 
exchange rate depreciates in other countries. In oil rich countries, highest responses to 
the supply shock come from domestic output and REER (G1 and G2, respectively). 
On the other hand, in the oil poor labor abundant countries responses are analogous to 
G2 countries. In the states with limited natural resources, the highest responses to 
world output come from domestic prices.  
 
A supply shock 
The clearest picture of the impulse responses in Figure 1 is the response of domestic 
outputs to supply shocks. The previous studies on the MENA countries in general 
attributed most of the fluctuations in the output to external shocks and/or the demand 
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shocks. Our findings show significance counterevidence against this finding. Our 
results confirm the findings of Agénor et al. (1998). The dynamics of adjustment to a 
supply shocks have the expected sign and confirm the relative importance of these 
shocks. Almost all variables in all groups show significant response to supply-side 
shocks. The effect of supply shocks on the domestic output is long lasting and in 
general approaching the permanent level in about 4 to 8 years. Domestic supply 
shocks have the largest and longest impact on the domestic output levels. The supply 
shock expands domestic output permanently as expected. A positive supply shock 
also decreases the price level permanently in more than half of the countries. There 
are some countries with a positive price response to output shocks, but except for 
Israel none of these responses are long lasting and significant. The responses of real 
exchange rates to supply shocks, appreciation in general, are also permanent except 
Kuwait in G1 and Syria in G2). In few cases there is evidence of depreciation but 
none of theses are significant. In summary, the responses most common to all the 
MENA countries are the responses to supply shock. Further, these responses are 
permanent and mostly significant.  
A relative demand shock 
The responses to shock in relative demand, public spending/debt changes are 
presented in Figures 1. As expected the higher public spending/debt cash rate results 
in increased real domestic output with significant effect up to 4 years and increased 
inflation about the same length with some more uncertainty. The impact on output 
seems to be stronger than prices, reflecting the fact that some of the increased demand 
will be absorbed by an increase in imports as the domestic currency also appreciates.  
Contrary to most of the responses to shocks in oil price, world output, and 
domestic output, the relative demand shocks have short effects on all domestic 
variables in every country in each group. This is a second common finding of this 
study. With some exceptions, the domestic outputs readjust to steady states in 8 years. 
On the price side, the responses are in general positive and long lasting in oil 
rich labor importing countries. There are a few exceptions in the oil rich and labor 
abundant countries where the responses are initially negative but not significant. This 
also seems true for some of the oil poor states (except Egypt, Malta, Morocco, and 
Turkey in G3). Finally, the highest responses to relative demand shocks come from 
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the real exchange rates. This should not come as surprise since the effect of fiscal 
shocks should be significantly felt on the real exchange rates. The real exchange rates 
appreciate in all countries and the effects are permanent lasting up to 20 years.  
An aggregate demand shock 
Responses to an aggregate demand shock are displayed in Figures 1, support what 
would be the conventional wisdom about nominal demand shocks, with inflation 
rising and the real exchange rate depreciating. This is clearly the case for all countries 
in each group. The responses of outputs to aggregate demand shocks are insignificant 
and ignorable even in the short-run. The response of prices is fast, where the full 
effect is realized in less than 8 years,  and permanent which confirms the conventional 
view that monetary expansion will only increase the price level permanently in the 
long-run. The domestic currencies respond for up to 4 to 8 years during which the 
price level did not still raise the long-run level yet. After the price level rises to the 
long-run level after 4 to 8 years the domestic currencies adjust back to the level before 
the aggregate demand shock. Our finding about no significant responses of outputs to 
monetary aggregate demand shocks even in the short-run may be somewhat 
unexpected conventionally, but there are certainly theoretical explanations in the 
literature. The long years of inflation in some of these countries rendered monetary 
expansion completely ineffective in raising the output, as the expectations and prices 
adjust quickly to such changes.    
Variance Decompositions 
We next turn to the forecast error variance decomposition of the three domestic 
variables, real GDP, real exchange rate, and price level. The decomposition of 
variance evaluates the relative importance of each of the structural innovations in the 
fluctuations of the variables at different time horizons. The information contained in 
decomposition of variance can be equivalently represented by impulse response 
functions. These variance decompositions are given in Table 2. 
Domestic output  
The forecast error variance decompositions for real output suggest that output 
fluctuations in the MENA countries are primarily due to supply and secondly to oil 
price shocks, implying that these countries are somewhat vulnerable to external 
shocks. In the first year, supply shocks explain up to 97% of output fluctuations 
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(Pakistan), and for all other countries contribution of the supply shocks to output 
variance is more than 50%. The effect of supply shocks are permanent and stay 
around the same level. In the long-run, oil price shocks are the second most important 
sources of output fluctuations, explaining about 10-33% of the output fluctuations for 
oil exporters. For Oman and Saudi Arabia the world output explains about 20 to 30% 
of the variance in output. For other countries, the results are not homogenous. For 
some countries relative demand shocks play an important role (Isreal and Jordan), 
while aggregate demand shocks are quite important in some countries in the short run 
(Egypt, Syria, and Jordan). This finding confirms the conventional view that the fiscal 
policies might be major source of changing economic activity while aggregate 
demand shocks may significantly contribute to output fluctuations in the short-run. 
Although the importance of the oil price is known, its contribution is secondary, even 
for oil rich countries, in our study. We should point out that our results confirm the 
supply shock nature of the imported input prices. Overall, most output fluctuations in 
the MENA countries are primarily due to supply, oil price, and world output shocks in 
the long-run. The role played by oil price by acting as a supply shock is although 
known, the significant role played by supply side shocks, and almost no contribution 
from the nominal shocks in the long-run and even in the short run (with three 
exceptions) is uncovered by our study. These results are complimentary to findings of 
Agénor, et al. (1998) for a group of developing countries. 
Domestic price level 
The forecast error variance decompositions for consumer price index suggest that the 
nominal shocks at least in the short run play important role in price fluctuations, 
explaining more than 70% of movements in the short-run in the majority of the 
MENA countries. The most striking finding across the groups of countries is the 
difference between G1 and the other groups. In the last four groups, variations in 
domestic price level are mostly due to nominal shocks, oil price and world output 
being the second and third important factors, respectively. However, in the G1 group 
of oil rich countries fiscal shocks are the main source of domestic price fluctuations 
both in the short- and the long-run. Within the groups, the following points are 
noteworthy: The supply shocks do not have any effect on the variation in the price 
level in Malta neither in the short- nor in the long-run. This shock accounts for 22% 
of the price fluctuations in Turkey both in the short- and long-run. Furthermore, Malta 
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and Turkey are countries depending highly on imported inputs; however, according to 
the variance decompositions, input price shocks explain 7% of the variation in the 
price level in Turkey while it explains 22% in Malta in the long-run. 
Real exchange rate 
The variance decompositions for real exchange rates given in Table 1 imply that, in 
contrast with other macroeconomic variables in this study, changes in relative demand 
do play the most important role in determining real exchange rate in the MENA 
countries. The contribution of fiscal or real demand shocks to fluctuations in the real 
exchange rate varies from 25 to 95% in both the short- and long-run. The contribution 
of real demand shock actually is more than 60% for almost all countries. We observe 
a significant difference among the oil rich and oil poor countries: Oil price shock is 
the second significant factor explaining about 20 to 30% of the variation in the real 
exchange rate fluctuations for oil exporters, while its role for oil importers is mixed. 
There are cases (except G5) where the fiscal shocks lose their effect on the real 
exchange rate variations over time, while other shocks gain importance (Saudi Arabia 
(G1), Iran (G2), Malta (G3), and Tunisia (G4)). Nominal shocks contribute less than 
10% to the real exchange rate fluctuations in all countries (except Sudan). Thus, the 
real exchange rates are mostly determined by real demand and oil price shocks in the 
short-run. These short-run sources of real exchange rate fluctuations are not preserved 
in the long-run. In the long-run the share of domestic supply shocks and world output 
increases. The external real shocks play some significant role in real exchange rate 
fluctuations in the long-run. Moreover, the results suggest that nominal shocks are not 
important determinants of the behavior of real exchange rates in the long-run. 
Stochastic shocks to the goods market (IS shocks) can induce excessive real exchange 
rate volatility. The small role played by nominal factors in explaining real exchange 
rate fluctuations is consistent with the evidence for some industrial and developing 
countries (see Lastraps, 1992; Hoffmaister and Roldós, 1997).  
4. Conclusion 
In this paper we used a small open economy SVAR model in order to examine the 
sources of macroeconomic fluctuations in the MENA region countries. The model 
seems to both capture most of the observed features of theses economies over time 
and uncover valuable information in regard to the response of domestic variables. 
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Some of our results are not expected by the conventional wisdom. In accordance with 
the small open economy assumption, and to disentangle the effects of external shocks 
from domestic shocks, we restrict domestic shocks by not allowing them to affect the 
world price of intermediate inputs or world output both in the short- and long-run. 
One of the virtues of this approach is that it allows us to identify and measure the 
effect of different types of shocks in a unified framework. We impose appropriate 
long-run restrictions, arising from macroeconomic theory, on the VAR model and 
identify four structural shocks: nominal demand, relative demand, supply, the world 
output, and imported input price shocks. The impulse response functions and variance 
decompositions reveal valuable information about the sources of macroeconomic 
fluctuations in the MENA countries. 
The feature which differentiates this work from its predecessors is the 
inclusion of external shocks and proper treatment of the assumption of a small open 
economy. Historical decompositions are used to consider the structure of the 
macroeconomic fluctuations for the period from 1960 to 2005, showing that, external 
supply shocks accounted by the shocks to world output and the imported input price 
shocks, which are proxied by the oil price shocks, do generally contribute 
significantly to macroeconomic fluctuations in the MENA countries, but they are 
certainly not the most important source of macroeconomic fluctuations for the oil 
poor countries. External shocks play an equally important role in output, price, and 
real exchange rate fluctuations in almost all oil rich countries. However, even in these 
countries the dominant source of output fluctuations in the long run are the domestic 
supply shocks. 
Our findings to our knowledge are the first to uncover the highly important 
role played by the supply side shock in the MENA region economies. Although the 
world output as well as the oil price shocks play a significant role in the long-run 
macroeconomic fluctuations, the study finds that the supply side shocks are the main 
source of output fluctuations in the long-run.  
The impulse responses and variance decompositions suggest that the world 
import price shocks are quite consistent with adverse “supply shock” view of the 
input prices for the majority of the MENA countries; where output falls, the real 
exchange rate depreciates, and prices increase. In the long-run, aggregate demand 
shocks do not appear to play any role in output movements in these countries. 
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Surprisingly, nominal aggregate demand shocks do also fail to affect output even in 
the short-run in some countries. It seems that after many years of high inflation, prices 
and wages adjust very quickly leaving no room for an increase in the output. Changes 
in fiscal policy play moderate and in some countries significant role in the real 
exchange rate fluctuations in the short- and long-run. Consistent with the 
conventional wisdom, nominal shocks play the most significant role on price level 
variations, particularly in the oil poor countries the price level is largely determined 
by the nominal shocks in the long-run. 
Overall the group of oil rich countries does show some similarity in terms of 
the responses of domestic variables particularly to external shocks. However, the 
findings for the majority of the MENA countries indicate that except the supply 
shocks the sources of macroeconomic fluctuations are mostly related to country 
specific conditions and policies. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
   Meann of the log values 
Countries Period N Y CPI REER 
Group 1: Oil Rich Labor Importing States      
Kuwait 1975-2006 32 24.09 3.88 4.40 
Oman 1972-2006 35 23.09 4.56 4.57 
Saudi Arabia 1968-2006 39 25.59 4.35 4.74 
      
Group 2: Oil Rich Labor Abundant States       
Algeria 1964-2006 43 24.30 2.75 5.07 
Iran 1965-2006 42 24.94 1.97 5.29 
Syria 1960-2006 47 22.88 2.81 4.94 
      
Group 3: Oil Poor Labor Abundant NICs       
Egypt 1960-2006 47 24.45 2.79 4.42 
Malta  1960-2006 47 21.07 4.04 4.75 
Mauritania 1960-2006 47 20.37 3.36 4.97 
Morocco 1960-2006 47 23.64 3.67 4.66 
Pakistan 1967-2006 40 24.37 3.46 4.97 
Turkey 1968-2006 39 25.49 -1.61 4.56 
      
Group 4: Oil Poor Limited Natural Resource States      
Israel 1960-2006 47 24.61 -0.69 4.48 
Jordan 1976-2006 31 22.53 4.14 4.64 
Tunisia 1962-2006 45 22.94 3.68 4.81 
      
Group 5: Natural Resource Poor States      
Sudan 1960-2006 47 22.58 -1.54 5.40 
      
Oil 3.28     
World GDP 30.54     
Y, CPI, and REER denote real DDP, consumer price index, and real exchange rate, respectively.  
All variables are in logarithms. 
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Table 2: FEVD of Domestic Variables 
Group 1: Oil Rich Labor Importing States 
Kuwait 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.004 0.03 0.7 0.08 0.19 
2 0.22 0.02 0.5 0.05 0.21 
4 0.24 0.03 0.47 0.07 0.2 
8 0.24 0.03 0.46 0.07 0.2 
20 0.24 0.03 0.46 0.07 0.2 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.1 0.04 0.04 0.8 0.02 
2 0.11 0.06 0.04 0.76 0.02 
4 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.76 0.02 
8 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.76 0.02 
20 0.12 0.06 0.04 0.76 0.02 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.005 0.06 0.15 0.55 0.25 
2 0.03 0.06 0.13 0.56 0.22 
4 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.54 0.22 
8 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.54 0.22 
20 0.05 0.06 0.13 0.54 0.22 
      
Oman 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.12 0.07 0.73 0.07 0.002 
2 0.23 0.17 0.55 0.05 0.01 
4 0.27 0.16 0.51 0.05 0.01 
8 0.28 0.16 0.51 0.05 0.01 
20 0.28 0.16 0.51 0.05 0.01 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.23 0.02 0.02 0.66 0.06 
2 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.63 0.08 
4 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.63 0.08 
8 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.63 0.08 
20 0.23 0.04 0.03 0.63 0.08 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.28 0.004 0.03 0.68 0.000001 
2 0.3 0.02 0.03 0.61 0.04 
4 0.3 0.03 0.03 0.59 0.05 
8 0.3 0.03 0.03 0.59 0.05 
20 0.3 0.03 0.03 0.59 0.05 
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SaudiArabia 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.09 0.05 0.81 0.03 0.02 
2 0.16 0.18 0.61 0.04 0.01 
4 0.16 0.22 0.57 0.04 0.01 
8 0.16 0.23 0.56 0.04 0.01 
20 0.16 0.23 0.56 0.04 0.01 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.05 0.16 0.12 0.64 0.03 
2 0.03 0.09 0.4 0.47 0.02 
4 0.11 0.07 0.49 0.31 0.01 
8 0.13 0.11 0.47 0.28 0.01 
20 0.13 0.11 0.47 0.28 0.01 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.08 0.001 0.25 0.48 0.18 
2 0.16 0.02 0.27 0.39 0.16 
4 0.17 0.06 0.26 0.36 0.13 
8 0.18 0.07 0.3 0.33 0.12 
20 0.18 0.07 0.3 0.33 0.12 
      
      
Group 2: Oil Rich Labor Abundant States  
Algeria 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.08 0.1 0.78 0.03 0.01 
2 0.08 0.09 0.75 0.06 0.02 
4 0.07 0.1 0.74 0.06 0.02 
8 0.07 0.1 0.74 0.06 0.02 
20 0.07 0.1 0.74 0.06 0.02 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.003 0.04 0.23 0.72 0.004 
2 0.005 0.04 0.26 0.69 0.01 
4 0.005 0.04 0.25 0.69 0.01 
8 0.005 0.04 0.25 0.69 0.01 
20 0.005 0.04 0.25 0.69 0.01 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.67 
2 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.25 0.64 
4 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.25 0.63 
8 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.25 0.63 
20 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.25 0.63 
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Iran 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.07 0.04 0.89 0.0008 0.004 
2 0.05 0.05 0.9 0.0006 0.004 
4 0.04 0.08 0.87 0.0006 0.003 
8 0.04 0.09 0.86 0.0006 0.003 
20 0.04 0.09 0.86 0.0006 0.003 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.02 0.01 0.11 0.81 0.06 
2 0.03 0.03 0.13 0.72 0.09 
4 0.03 0.05 0.17 0.67 0.08 
8 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.66 0.08 
20 0.03 0.06 0.17 0.66 0.08 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.05 0.03 0.1 0.03 0.79 
2 0.06 0.03 0.11 0.03 0.76 
4 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.75 
8 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.75 
20 0.06 0.04 0.12 0.03 0.75 
      
      
Syria 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.02 0.01 0.91 0.01 0.06 
2 0.12 0.09 0.66 0.02 0.12 
4 0.12 0.09 0.64 0.02 0.13 
8 0.12 0.09 0.64 0.02 0.13 
20 0.12 0.09 0.64 0.02 0.13 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.02 0.0005 0.002 0.97 0.0008 
2 0.02 0.002 0.01 0.96 0.004 
4 0.02 0.004 0.01 0.95 0.01 
8 0.02 0.004 0.01 0.95 0.01 
20 0.02 0.004 0.01 0.95 0.01 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.01 0.0001 0.004 0.12 0.87 
2 0.01 0.004 0.01 0.14 0.84 
4 0.01 0.005 0.01 0.14 0.84 
8 0.01 0.005 0.01 0.14 0.84 
20 0.01 0.005 0.01 0.14 0.84 
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Group 3: Oil Poor Labor Abundant NICs 
Egypt 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.05 0.0001 0.88 0.03 0.04 
2 0.09 0.03 0.81 0.02 0.04 
4 0.1 0.07 0.76 0.02 0.04 
8 0.11 0.08 0.75 0.02 0.04 
20 0.11 0.08 0.75 0.02 0.04 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.8 0.0004 
2 0.17 0.03 0.01 0.8 0.0008 
4 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.79 0.0008 
8 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.79 0.0008 
20 0.16 0.03 0.01 0.79 0.0008 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.001 0.01 0.002 0.001 0.99 
2 0.05 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.88 
4 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.88 
8 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.88 
20 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.88 
      
      
Malta 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.04 0.09 0.86 0.01 0.001 
2 0.17 0.07 0.75 0.01 0.001 
4 0.18 0.13 0.68 0.01 0.001 
8 0.18 0.16 0.66 0.01 0.001 
20 0.18 0.16 0.65 0.01 0.001 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.05 0.00004 0.08 0.87 0.00001 
2 0.12 0.16 0.08 0.64 0.00001 
4 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.63 0.00002 
8 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.63 0.00002 
20 0.12 0.16 0.09 0.63 0.00002 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.001 0.01 0.002 0.01 0.98 
2 0.19 0.05 0.002 0.08 0.67 
4 0.22 0.13 0.002 0.07 0.57 
8 0.22 0.13 0.002 0.07 0.57 
20 0.22 0.13 0.002 0.07 0.57 
      
 27 
Mauritania 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.02 0.004 0.93 0.03 0.02 
2 0.02 0.07 0.8 0.06 0.04 
4 0.02 0.08 0.79 0.06 0.04 
8 0.02 0.08 0.79 0.06 0.04 
20 0.02 0.08 0.79 0.06 0.04 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.001 0.03 0.01 0.94 0.02 
2 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.91 0.04 
4 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.91 0.04 
8 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.91 0.04 
20 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.91 0.04 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.03 0.000004 0.00001 0.36 0.61 
2 0.03 0.000005 0.00002 0.38 0.59 
4 0.03 0.003 0.000 0.38 0.59 
8 0.03 0.003 0.000 0.38 0.59 
20 0.03 0.003 0.000 0.38 0.59 
      
      
Morocco 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.001 0.03 0.93 0.03 0.001 
2 0.05 0.03 0.86 0.06 0.001 
4 0.05 0.04 0.84 0.06 0.001 
8 0.05 0.04 0.84 0.06 0.001 
20 0.05 0.04 0.84 0.06 0.001 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.005 0.16 0.02 0.76 0.05 
2 0.003 0.12 0.04 0.73 0.1 
4 0.003 0.14 0.04 0.72 0.1 
8 0.004 0.14 0.04 0.71 0.1 
20 0.004 0.14 0.04 0.71 0.1 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.08 0.21 0.01 0.12 0.58 
2 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.2 0.48 
4 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.2 0.48 
8 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.2 0.48 
20 0.06 0.25 0.01 0.2 0.48 
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Pakistan 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.002 0.01 
2 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.003 0.01 
4 0.01 0.01 0.97 0.004 0.01 
8 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.004 0.01 
20 0.01 0.01 0.96 0.004 0.01 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.01 0.15 0.02 0.8 0.02 
2 0.04 0.18 0.13 0.63 0.02 
4 0.05 0.18 0.13 0.61 0.02 
8 0.05 0.18 0.13 0.61 0.02 
20 0.05 0.18 0.13 0.61 0.02 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.92 
2 0.09 0.05 0.01 0.23 0.63 
4 0.07 0.19 0.05 0.24 0.46 
8 0.06 0.2 0.06 0.24 0.44 
20 0.06 0.2 0.06 0.24 0.44 
      
      
Turkey 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.07 0.04 0.85 0.02 0.02 
2 0.07 0.05 0.79 0.03 0.06 
4 0.07 0.06 0.78 0.03 0.06 
8 0.07 0.06 0.78 0.03 0.06 
20 0.07 0.06 0.78 0.03 0.06 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.004 0.01 0.19 0.79 0.01 
2 0.02 0.03 0.19 0.74 0.02 
4 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.74 0.02 
8 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.74 0.02 
20 0.03 0.03 0.19 0.74 0.02 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.0001 0.04 0.21 0.01 0.74 
2 0.07 0.04 0.23 0.02 0.65 
4 0.07 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.64 
8 0.07 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.64 
20 0.07 0.06 0.22 0.02 0.64 
      
 29 
 
      
Group 4: Oil Poor Limited Natural Resource States 
Israel 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.02 0.01 0.87 0.09 0.01 
2 0.02 0.04 0.84 0.1 0.01 
4 0.02 0.12 0.75 0.1 0.01 
8 0.02 0.12 0.75 0.1 0.01 
20 0.02 0.12 0.75 0.1 0.01 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.06 0.00003 0.17 0.78 0.0003 
2 0.05 0.06 0.22 0.67 0.003 
4 0.05 0.06 0.24 0.64 0.003 
8 0.05 0.06 0.24 0.64 0.003 
20 0.05 0.06 0.24 0.64 0.003 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.2 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.71 
2 0.2 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.7 
4 0.2 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.69 
8 0.2 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.69 
20 0.2 0.01 0.03 0.07 0.69 
      
      
Jordan 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.0001 0.01 0.71 0.01 0.27 
2 0.03 0.08 0.59 0.1 0.2 
4 0.04 0.08 0.57 0.1 0.21 
8 0.04 0.09 0.56 0.1 0.21 
20 0.04 0.09 0.56 0.1 0.21 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.11 0.0004 0.35 0.52 0.01 
2 0.1 0.02 0.34 0.53 0.02 
4 0.1 0.02 0.33 0.53 0.02 
8 0.1 0.02 0.33 0.53 0.02 
20 0.1 0.02 0.33 0.53 0.02 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.08 0.0004 0.02 0.26 0.64 
2 0.08 0.12 0.03 0.37 0.4 
4 0.09 0.18 0.03 0.37 0.33 
8 0.09 0.2 0.03 0.37 0.32 
20 0.09 0.2 0.03 0.37 0.32 
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Tunisia 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.19 0.04 0.68 0.06 0.02 
2 0.17 0.09 0.59 0.09 0.06 
4 0.17 0.11 0.56 0.08 0.07 
8 0.17 0.11 0.56 0.08 0.07 
20 0.17 0.11 0.56 0.08 0.07 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.002 0.01 0.14 0.85 0.004 
2 0.14 0.06 0.15 0.65 0.004 
4 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.62 0.004 
8 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.62 0.004 
20 0.17 0.06 0.14 0.62 0.004 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.01 0.49 0.004 0.01 0.48 
2 0.03 0.59 0.01 0.01 0.37 
4 0.03 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.37 
8 0.03 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.37 
20 0.03 0.58 0.01 0.01 0.37 
      
      
Group 5: Natural Resource Poor States 
Sudan 
 Proportions of FE in "GDP" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.00002 0.14 0.86 0.001 0.0005 
2 0.002 0.19 0.8 0.002 0.001 
4 0.004 0.21 0.78 0.002 0.001 
8 0.004 0.22 0.78 0.002 0.002 
20 0.004 0.22 0.78 0.002 0.002 
      
 Proportions of FE in "REER" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.03 0.001 0.01 0.88 0.07 
2 0.03 0.002 0.01 0.81 0.15 
4 0.03 0.003 0.01 0.8 0.15 
8 0.03 0.003 0.01 0.8 0.15 
20 0.03 0.003 0.01 0.8 0.15 
      
 Proportions of FE in "CPI" accounted for by 
Years OIL WGDP GDP REER CPI 
1 0.02 0.00009 0.09 0.00001 0.89 
2 0.01 0.002 0.07 0.13 0.78 
4 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.77 
8 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.77 
20 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.13 0.77 
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Figure 2 
Group 2: Oil Rich Labor Abundant States 
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Figure 3 
Group 3: Oil Poor Labor Abundant NICs 
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Figure 4 
Group 4: Oil Poor Limited Natural Resource States 
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Figure 5 
Group 5: Natural Resource Poor States (Sudan) 
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